Watkins v. United States Army and the Employment Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men by Leonard, Arthur S.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1989
Watkins v. United States Army and the
Employment Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men
Arthur S. Leonard
New York Law School, arthur.leonard@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
Law and Gender Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
40 Labor Law Journal 438–445 (1989)
Watkins v. United States Army and 
The Employment Rights of Lesbians 
and Gay Men 
By Arthur S. Leonard 
Professor Leonard is with New York Law School. 
© 1989 by ArthurS. Leonard 
On May 3, 1989, an en bane panel of 11 
judges of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit voted seven to 
four to order the United States Army to 
allow former Staff Sergeant Perry Wat-
kins, a gay man, to reenlist, even though 
an Army regulation forbids enlistment of 
homosexual persons. 1 Five members of the 
panel based their decision on the common 
law concept of equitable estoppel, reason-
ing that because Watkins had served 
excellently from his original enlistment in 
1967 until the Army refused him reenlist-
ment in 1982, "equity cries out and 
demands that the Army be estopped from 
refusing to reenlist Watkins on the basis 
of his homosexuality."2 
Two members of the panel, who had 
constituted the majority of a three-judge 
panel that issued a similar order on Wat-
kins' behalf on February 10, 1988,3 con-
curred on the ground that the Army's 
regulations excluding lesbians and gay 
1 Watkins v. United States, 50 EPD U 38,967 (9th Cir., 
May 3, !989). The pertinent regulation is AR 635-200, ch. 
IS. 
2 Id. at EPD p. 57,155. 
3 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 46 EPD U 38,063 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
4 Although the Fifth Amendment does not include the 
phrase "equal protection of the laws" found in the 14th 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has construed the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to require the 
federal government to extend equal ~rotection of the laws to 
all persons in the United States on the same basis that binds 
the states under the 14th Amendment. See Watkins v. U.S. 
Army, 847 F.2d at 1335, n.9. 
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men from service violated the federal gov-
ernment's obligation of equal protection 
of the laws under the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution.4 The majority of the 
1988 panel had concluded that the 
Army's regulations discriminated on the 
basis of sexual orientation, which the 
panel considered to be a suspect classifica-
tion whose use was not sufficiently justi-
fied by the military to withstand judicial 
review. The three-judge panel decision, 
which was vacated by the en bane deci-
sion, was the subject of an earlier article 
in this Journal5 and has already served as 
precedent in another long-term court 
struggle over the military's regulations: 
BenShalom v. Marsh.6 Still pending before 
the 9th Circuit are two other cases 
presenting similar issues: High Tech Gays 
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance 
Office/ and Pruitt v. Weinberger.8 
At the heart of the battle in these cases 
is the question whether sexual orienta-
5 Robinson, Franklin, and Allen, "Watkins v. United 
States: New Insights on the Termination of Employees for 
Sexual Orientation," LABOR LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 40, No. 2, 
February 1989, 117-121. 
6 703 F.Supp. 1372, 49 EPD U 38,784 (D.Wis. !989). The 
7th Circuit heard oral argument in the Army's appeal of 
this case on May 18, 1989. The case dates from Miriam 
BenShalom's discharge for homosexuality in 1976. 
7 668 F.Supp. !361, 45 EPD U 37,597 (N.D.Cal. 1987). 
This case challenges unequal treatment of lesbian and gay 
applicants for industrial security clearances to work on 
defense contracts for private employers. 
s 625 F.Supp. 625 (C.D.Cal. 1987). 
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tion9 should be treated as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect classification for purposes of 
equal protection analysis under the 5th 
and 14th Amendments. As the Supreme 
Court has developed doctrine under these 
Amendments, a finding that governmen-
tal classifications based on sexual orienta-
tion are suspect would mean that federal, 
state, and local governments could not 
adopt policies adversely affecting lesbians 
and gay men unless those policies were 
necessary to achieve a compelling govern-
mental interest and narrowly tailored to 
meet that interest. This test is referred to 
as strict scrutiny. If sexual orientation 
were found to be quasi-suspect, such clas-
sifications would be subject to somewhat 
heightened scrutiny, requiring the govern-
ment to show that the classification is 
substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental interest. If the classification 
used by the government does not merit 
heightened scrutiny, it will be sustained if 
it is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. 
The Supreme Court's approach to iden-
tifying suspect classifications was most 
recently articulated in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, 10 in which· the 
Court determined that mentally retarded 
persons do not constitute either a suspect 
or a quasi-suspect classification. Justice 
Byron White, writing for the Court, 
stated that race, alienage, and national 
origin are suspect classifications because 
"[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to 
the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such con-
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice 
and antipathy-a view that those in the 
burdened class are not as worthy or 
deserving as others."11 Since such discrim-
9 
"Sexual orientation" is a term of art in the social sci-
ences, referring to the gender of sexual object choice. In New 
York City's ordinance forbidding discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation in employment, it is defined as "hetero-
sexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality." N.Y.C. Admin. 
Code, section 8-108.1{3). 
10 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
11 Id. at 440. 
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ination is likely to reflect majoritarian 
prejudice and not to be correctable 
through the legislative process, the courts 
will subject it to strict scrutiny. 
Identification of Suspect 
Classifications 
The Court subjects sex classifications to 
heightened scrutiny because "[t]hat fac-
tor generally provides no sensible ground 
for differential treatment."12 "[T]he sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation 
to ability to perform or contribute to soci-
ety."13 Gender classifications in govern-
ment policies frequently "reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative capabili-
ties of men and women." 14 Illegitimacy is 
at least quasi-suspect as well, because it 
"is beyond the individual's control and 
bears 'no relation to the individual's abil-
ity to participate in and contribute to 
society.' " 15 
The Court has refused to apply height-
ened review or strict scrutiny to classifica-
tions based on age or mental retardation 
because of its view that neither the aged 
nor the mentally retarded have been his-
torically singled out for unequal treat-
ment based on "stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of 
their abilities." 16 Such unequal treatment 
as has existed, according to the Court, has 
usually been based on actual characteris-
tics of elderly or retarded persons, and, as 
often as not, the unequal treatment was 
to provide special protections to those 
individuals. Consequently, in the Court's 
view, one has little reason to suspect that 
prejudice rather than rationality is at 
work when the government uses age or 
retardation as a classifying characteristic 
in a statute, so normal rationality review 
13 Id. at 440-41, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677,686, 5 EPD ~ 8609 (1973) {plurality opinion). 
14 Id. at 441. 
IS Id. at 441, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 
505 (1976). 
16 Id. at 441, quoting Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 12 EPD ~ 10,998 (1976). 
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is the relevant test for the reviewing court 
to employ in evaluating the constitution-
ality of the government's policy. 
Nonetheless, in City of Cleburne, the 
Court struck down a zoning ordinance 
which required special approval for the 
operation of a group home for the 
retarded. The Court found that the justifi-
cations articulated for the special 
approval requirements were pretextual, 
because they would have applied to other 
types of group homes for which special 
approval was not required, leading the 
Court to conclude that the real motiva-
tion for the ordinance was dislike or 
prejudice against retarded persons based 
on stereotypes rather than the reasons 
articulated by the city. Thus, rationality 
review is not a meaningless formality, at 
least as applied by the Court in Cleburne. 
This review of the Court's determina-
tions regarding suspect classifications 
shows that there is no fixed checklist of 
factors, but rather an approach of evalu-
ating each challenged classification with 
an eye toward determining whether there 
is a substantial likelihood that unfavora-
ble governmental treatment is motivated 
by unjustified prejudices and stereotypes. 
Various factors may contribute to that 
determination, but no one factor is deter-
minative by itself. The reason the Court 
applies heightened scrutiny to suspect or 
quasi-suspect classifications is that when 
such classifications are used, it is likely 
that the principle of constitutional equal-
ity (that equally situated individuals 
must receive equal treatment from their 
government) is being violated. For the 
government to prevail in such a case, it 
must show that the unequal treatment is 
objectively justified because the persons 
involved are not equal with regard to 
characteristics that are relevant for the 
legitimate purposes of the governmental 
policy at issue. 
17 822 F.2d 97, 43 EPD ~ 37,174 (D.C.Cir. 1987). The 
1988 Watkins decision also seemed contrary to prior 9th 
Circuit precedent for the same reason. See Beller v. Mid-
dendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 24 EPD U 31,378 (9th Cir. 1980), 
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Caselaw on Policies Excluding 
Homosexuals 
The 1988 Ninth Circuit decision in 
Watkins was particularly significant 
because it marked the first time that a 
federal appellate court used the Supreme 
Court's equal protection doctrines to 
declare unequivocally that sexual orienta-
tion, i.e., the status of being heterosexual, 
homosexual, or bisexual, was a suspect 
classification when used to treat homosex-
uals adversely. The 1988 Watkins deci-
sion superficially appeared contrary to a 
1987 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Padula v. Webster, 17 that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's policy 
of refusing to hire as special agents per-
sons who were "practicing homosexuals" 
did not violate the equal protection 
requirement. The Padula decision was 
primarily based on the Supreme Court's 
1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick18 that 
the practice of "homosexual sodomy" 
could be criminalized by the states 
without offending the Due Process Clause 
of the 14th Amendment because the abil-
ity to engage in such sexual conduct was 
not, in the Court's view, a fundamental 
right and the presumed moral views of a 
majority of a state's citizens regarding 
such conduct provided a sufficient basis 
under rationality review to sustain such 
criminal laws. 
The D.C. Circuit in Padula declared 
that the F.B.I.'s policy, applying as it did 
to persons who had engaged in conduct 
declared criminal by half the states, was a 
rational policy for a national law enforce-
ment agency. So long as the states could 
constitutionally criminalize "homosexual 
sodomy," the D.C. Circuit opined that it 
would be incongruous to subject the 
F.B.I.'s policy to heightened or strict scru-
tiny because "there can hardly be more 
palpable discrimination against a class 
than making the conduct that defines the 
which ruled with regard to superseded Army regulations 
premising dismissal on conduct rather than orientation. 
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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class criminal." 19 The D.C. Circuit's 
approach to this issue has since been fol-
lowed by the Federal Circuit in Wood-
ward v. United States.2o 
In its now-vacated 1988 Watkins deci-
sion, which has been followed to the letter 
on this point by the United States Dis-
trict Court in BenShalom, the panel 
majority focused on a key distinction 
between the F.B.I. policy challenged in 
Padula and the Army policy challenged in 
Watkins: the F.B.I.'s alleged policy was a 
policy of discrimination based on an 
applicant's conduct, while the Army's pol-
icy was to discriminate based on orienta-
tion or status. Indeed, the Army's 
regulation would allow continued military 
service by heterosexual persons who had 
engaged in homosexual conduct, but 
would exclude homosexuals who were 
entirely celibate or engaged solely in het-
erosexual conduct. While Hardwick set-
tles, at least for now, that the government 
can outlaw certain same-sex conduct 
without offending the Due Process Clause, 
differential treatment based on status 
presents a different issue, as the Supreme 
Court itself recognized in 1962 when it 
ruled that California could not impose 
criminal sanctions on a person for the 
status of being addicted to controlled sub-
stances without violating the. Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment, even though there was no 
constitutional bar to criminalizing the use 
of controlled substances.21 
By analogy to this distinction, Judge 
Norris of the Ninth Circuit contends in 
19 822 F.2d at 103. 
20 871 F.2d 1068, 49 EPD U 38,877 (Fed.Cir., March 29, 
1989). 
21 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Sec-
ond Circuit has also recently noted this distinction in Falk 
v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941 (March 30, 1989), 
commenting that a rule that would "penalize military per-
sonnel for their status as homosexuals ... may be constitu-
tionally infirm." See also, Sunstein, "Sexual Orientation and 
the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due 
Process and Equal Protection," 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 
1162 (1988). 
22 Judge Norris's concurring opinion in the May 3 en bane 
decision essentially replicates his opinion for the 1988 panel. 
50 EPD ~ 38,967 at pp. 57,156-57,173. Concurring Judge 
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Watkins 22 that the Hardwick decision is 
not relevant to constitutional evaluation 
of the Army's policy. For one thing, the 
Hardwick decision concerns only conduct 
of the type defined by Georgia as "sod-
omy" (anal or oral intercourse), and there 
is a wide range of same-sex contact that 
falls short of that definition and is not 
necessarily subject to criminalization 
under the authority of that decision. (Dis-
trict Judge Henderson makes the same 
point in his decision in High Tech Gays,23 
which held unconstitutional certain barri-
ers to lesbian and gay applicants 
obtaining security clearances for work on 
defense contracts. Judge Henderson con-
cluded that sexual orientation was at least 
a quasi-suspect classification requiring 
heightened scrutiny.) Furthermore, Judge 
Norris demonstrates that the Army's pol-
icy does not define the excluded class in 
terms of conduct, but rather in terms of 
orientation, thereby leaving open for eval-
uation the question of whether such a 
status-based exclusion meets the criteria 
for designation as a suspect classifica-
tion.24 
Sexual Orientation as a Suspect 
Classification 
Once the tests described in City of 
Cleburne are applied, it becomes clear 
that some form of heightened scrutiny 
should be given to governmental policies 
that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.25 The history of prejudice, 
and indeed violence, against persons on 
the basis of their sexual orientation is long 
Canby stated his total agreement with Judge Norris's equal 
protection analysis. Id. at p. 57,173. 
23 668 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
24 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 50 EPD U 38,967 at pp. 
57,158-57,160 (May 3, 1989). 
25 An alternative analysis would suggest that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation is merely a variation 
of sex discrimination, and thus entitled to heightened scru-
tiny as such. See Chang, "Conflict, Coherence, and Constitu-
tional Intent," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 753, 825-26, 868-70 (1987). 
This contention comes up against caselaw holding that 
sexual orientation discrimination is not covered by Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, such as DeSantis v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 19 EPD U 9271 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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and well-documented. In the numerous 
cases challenging the exclusionary policies 
of the military, courts have found again 
and again that the personnel involved had 
extraordinarily good records, indicating 
that their sexual orientation was not nec-
essarily a disqualifying factor. Watkins, 
through a military career of 14 years, had 
been repeatedly promoted and rated 
highly, and his various commanding 
officers had testified in favor of his reten-
tion in the service. 
Furthermore, although scientists are 
not unanimous on the point, there is a 
growing consensus that sexual orientation 
as such is a fairly fixed component of 
personal identity, largely impervious to 
change.26 Here, the status vs. conduct dis-
tinction comes into play again; it seems 
that therapists can in some cases induce 
changes in sexual behavior by individuals 
highly motivated to change, but that 
underlying sexual orientation is not 
changeable. As such, sexual orientation, in 
common with illegitimacy, would be a sus-
pect classification because it "is beyond 
the individual's control and bears 'no rela-
tion to the individual's ability to partici-
pate in and contribute to society.' "27 
Given these factors, Judge Norris con-
cluded that when government uses sexual 
orientation as a classification for purposes 
of discrimination or exclusion, there is 
good reason to suspect that the policy is 
motivated by prejudice and stereotype, 
rather than by objective justification rele-
26 For summaries of current thought on this subject, see 
Isay, Being Homosexual: Gay Men and Their Development 
(1989); Lewes, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homo-
sexuality (1988); Money, Gay, Straight, and In-Between: 
The Sexology of Erotic Orientation (1988); Green, The Sissy-
Boy Syndrome and the Development of Homosexuality 
(1987); Weinrich, Sexual Landscapes: Why We Are What 
We Are, Why We Love Whom We Love (1987); Bell, Wein-
berg & Hammersmith, Sexual Preference: Its Development 
in Men and Women (1981); Marmor, Homosexual Behavior: 
A Modern Reappraisal (1980). 
27 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 
427 u.s. 190 (1976). 
28 There is considerable support in legal literature for this 
conclusion. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 248 
n.S2 (1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1616 
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vant to legitimate government goals.28 If 
the objective of the Army in maintaining 
its regulation is to advance the national 
interest and security of the United States, 
the regulation is counterproductive 
because it deprives the military of the 
services of an excellent soldier such as 
Perry Watkins. The regulation seems 
based on categorical dislike rather than on 
an individualized assessment of aptitude 
for service,29 and the justifications 
advanced by the military ring hollow, in 
Judge Norris's view, because they appear 
based on the presumed prejudice and dis-
like of homosexual persons by society, 
rather than on proof of harm to the 
national interest or security from allowing 
gay people to serve.30 
The 1989 en bane panel resolved the 
matter without reaching these constitu-
tional issues by determining that the 
Army's treatment of Watkins from 1967 
through 1982 merited invocation of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. But 
implicit in the panel's decision was a 
rejection of the Army's proffered justifica-
tions for excluding homosexuals from the 
service, because one of the tests for the 
appropriateness of raising an estoppel 
against the government is whether the 
court's order will prejudice the public 
interest. The court resolved this question 
decisively against the government on the 
basis of Watkin's excellent military record 
and the obvious disservice to the country 
(2d ed. 1988); Note, "An Argument for the Application of 
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications 
Based on Homosexuality," 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797 (1984); 
Note, "The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: 
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification," 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1285 (1985). 
29 This is well illustrated by another case now in litiga-
tion, where a cadet at the Naval Academy who had never 
engaged in any sexual contact with another man was dis-
missed for "lack of aptitude" after confessing his homosex-
ual orientation to a superior officer. The cadet in question 
was near the top of his class and honored as a corps com-
mander. Some lack of aptitude! Steffan v. Cheney, Civ. 
Action No. 88-3669 (D.D.C., filed December 29, 1988). 
JO Watkins v. U.S. Army, 50 EPD U 38,967 at pp. 
57,170-57,173 (May 3, 1989). 
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of excluding such an outstanding soldier 
from further service in the Army.31 
Protective Policies 
The final word has yet to be written on 
the equal protection issue as it applies to 
the employment rights of lesbians and gay 
men by governmental bodies. However, 
many public and private sector employers 
are already bound by administrative or 
legislative policies and common law prin-
ciples which affect their discretion regard-
ing treatment of lesbian and gay 
employees. Because these are rarely 
articulated expressly in statutes, they are 
not as well known or as easy to research as 
the familiar statutory prohibitions 
against discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, national origin, or age. 
A brief review of these policies is useful in 
placing the outcome of the equal protec-
tion debate in proper perspective for 
employers. 
In the public sector, it is reasonably 
well settled that various constitutional 
provisions other than the Equal Protec-
tion Clause provide protections for lesbian 
and gay public servants. As early as 1969, 
federal courts took the position that due 
process requirements preclude dismissal 
of most civil servants for "homosexuality" 
without a showing that their conduct has 
impaired their ahility to perform their 
jobs.32 Pursuant to the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978,33 the federal Office 
of Personnel Management issued a Policy 
Statement in 1980 that sexual orientation 
would not be the basis for removal of 
federal employees without a showing that 
the individual's conduct had impaired the 
31 Watkins v. U.S. Army, Id. at pp. 57,152·57,155 (May 
3, 1989). 
32 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.Cir. 1969). 
33 P.L. 95454, Title II, codified in pertinent part at 5 
U.S.C. sections 7511·14. 
34 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); National Gay Task Force v. 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270, 34 
EPD ff 34,357 (lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided 
Court, 470 U.S. 903, 36 EPD ff 35,065 (1985). 
35 For a current list, see Leonard, Gay & Lesbian Rights 
Protections in the U.S.: An Introduction to Gay and Lesbian 
Employment Rights 
efficiency of the service. Federal courts 
have also held that the First Amendment 
would protect public employees who 
speak out in support of equal rights for 
lesbian and gay people.34 These protec-
tions are amplified at the state level by 
gubernatorial executive orders and stat-
utes in about a dozen jurisdictions.35 At 
the county and municipal levels, ordi-
nances and executive orders in 76 jurisdic-
tions forbid such discrimination.36 
Lesbian and gay employees in the pri-
vate sector have less protection from dis-
crimination, but more than is commonly 
supposed. For one thing, labor arbitrators 
who have ruled on the subject seem to 
agree that homosexuality, including pri-
vate sexual conduct, does not constitute 
just cause for discharge under the typical 
collective bargaining agreement.37 For 
another, developing common law excep-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine 
are likely to result in protecting lesbian 
and gay employees from discharge when 
their conduct has not affected their abil-
ity to do their jobs. In particular, the 
express contract exceptions premised on 
oral or written assurances of job security 
recognized in a majority of states and the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which is growing in acceptance, would 
result in many employees having common 
law remedies for discharges premised 
solely on their sexual orientation or off-
duty sexual conduct.38 
There is also a growing body of statu-
tory protection. Wisconsin became the 
first state to enact a statutory prohibition 
on public and private sector employment 
discrimination 'on the basis of sexual ori-
Civil Rights (1989), available from the National Gay & 
Lesbian Task Force, 1517 U St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 
20009. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Hughes Air Corp., 73 L.A. 148 (Barsamian, 
1979). 
38 See, generally, Leonard, A New Common Law of 
Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 631 (1988). Of 
course, adoption of just cause discharge statutes such as 
that recently enacted in Montana would similarly restrict 
employers. 
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entation in 1982.39 Similar legislative pro-
posals have been making headway in 
several states. In California, the legisla-
ture passed such a bill several years ago, 
which was vetoed by the governor. The 
California Supreme Court ruled in 1979 
that regulated public utilities could not 
discriminate against employees known or 
suspected to be gay,40 and the state's 
Attorney General has opined that existing 
civil rights laws in that state may provide 
equivalent protection to many employ-
ees.41 In Massachusetts, a bill passed both 
houses of the legislature in 1987, but final 
enactment was prevented by last minute 
procedural maneuvers by a few opponents 
in leadership positions. In 1989, new 
efforts at enactment were succcessful in 
at least one legislative house in Iowa and 
Massachusetts. 
Local governments throughout the 
United States have legislated to ban pri-
vate sector employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. A count by 
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
at the end of 1988 showed such laws in 
effect in 41·municipalities and three coun-
ties, including five of the ten most popu-
lous cities in the United States.42 
Contrary to the views of some that the 
AIDS epidemic would slow the enactment 
of such local laws, 20 were enacted since 
AIDS began to emerge as a subject of 
public discussion in the early 1980s, 
including most notably in New York City 
(1986) and Chicago (1988). Furthermore, 
lesbian or gay employees who encounter 
discrimination because of employer or co-
employee fear of AIDS may find protec-
tion under disability discrimination 
laws.43 
39 Leonard, supra note 36. 
40 Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 892 (Calif. 1979). 
41 Attorney General Opinion No. 85404. 
42 Leonard, Gay & Lesbian Rights Protections, supra. 
43 E.g., Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J.Super. 370, 549 A.2d 900 (1987) (housing discrimination against gay men due to fear 
of AIDS violates state law against handicap discrimination). 
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Conclusion 
If the federal courts finally resolve the 
Equal Protection debate in favor of 
heightened scrutiny for governmental 
classifications that disadvantage persons 
because of their sexual orientations, pub-
lic employers will have further reason to 
reconsider existing policies or biases 
against lesbian and gay people as employ-
ees or clients of public programs. Height-
ened scrutiny for such classifications 
seems justified under the approach devel-
oped by the Supreme Court and most 
recently described in City of Cleburne. 
Cases now pending in the 7th and 9th 
Circuits may provide the vehicles for 
Supreme Court consideration of the issue 
early in the 1990s.44 
Regardless how the Equal Protection 
issue is resolved, however, there is an 
existing growing body of law restricting 
the discretion of employers in dealing 
with lesbian and gay employees. Conse-
quently, employers in both the public and 
private sectors cannot assume that les-
bian and gay employees necessarily lack 
legal recourse for discrimination or dis-
charge which is not objectively defensible. 
The continued trend of enactment of 
protective local laws and the developing 
federal caselaw seem part of a more gen-
eral move by society to recognize the cen-
tral role of employment in people's lives, 
which may eventuate in general protec-
tion against discharge without just cause. 
Until such time, however, employers 
would be well advised to educate them-
selves about the existing restrictions on 
their discretion to discharge lesbian and 
gay employees. Furthermore, employers 
may well take a factual lesson from the 
case of Staff Sergeant Perry Watkins. 
44 BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F.Supp. 1372, 49 EPD 
U 38,784 (D.Wis. 1989); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus-
trial Security Clearance Office, 668 F.Supp. 1361, 45 EPD 
U 37,597 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 625 
F.Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
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There are millions of lesbian and gay 
employees in this country who render val-
uable and faithful service to their employ-
ers, and whose sexual orientation should 
not serve as a barrier to their continued 
contributions in the workplace. 
[The End] 
Corporation Charged with Manslaughter 
A corporation is sufficiently a "person" to be charged with manslaughter, 
the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in remanding People v. General Dynam-
ics Land Systems, Inc., 1989 OSHD ff 28,467) for trial. Lower courts erred in 
refusing to bind over the corporate defendant on an involuntary manslaughter 
charge for the death of an employee who was overcome by Gensolv-D (Freon) 
fumes. Conflicting evidence on the corporation's negligence created an issue of 
fact to be resolved by a jury. The solvent was used to clean the interior of 
army tanks, aild the worker was killed when he attempted to drive a recently 
sprayed tank. There was conflicting evidence regarding whether General 
Dynamics had a procedure for safely cleaning the tanks and whether safety 
bulletins containing the procedure were seen by workers. A lower court's 
dismissal of a charge of willful violation of a Michigan OSH ventilation 
standard was affirmed, since the head and shoulders of the employee remained 
above the level of the hatch cover, outside the tank interior. 
Employer Convicted of Homicide by Reckless Conduct 
A jury verdict convicting a corporate employer of homicide by reckless 
conduct was affirmed by a Wisconsin Circuit Court of Appeals Wisconsin v. 
Shoreline Support Corp., 1989 OSHD ff 28,505). An employee fell to his death 
from a 75-foot cliff while working unsupervised. The jury's conclusion that 
failure to provide trained supervision for an inexperienced employee consti-
tuted recklessness was a reasonable determination, the court found. The court 
rejected the employer's argument that state criminal action was precluded 
because an action had also been instituted under the federal OSH Act. 
Previous state court decisions have established that OSHA regulations do not 
preempt criminal prosecution for reckless homicide. 
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